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Models of culture are operationalized as individualism and collectivism and have not given suf- 
ficient attention to other organizing axes+specially how a society handles power, depend- 
ence, and equality. Shavitt, Lalwani, Zhang, and Torelli (2006) make a significant contribution 
by first reminding the field of power distance (Hofstede, 1980) and then moving beyond a sin- 
gle factor to highlight benefits of Triandis' (1995) horizontal (valuing equality) individual- 
ism~ollectivism and vertical (emphasizing hierarchy) individualism-collectivism model. But 
this approach makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of power and individualism or collec- 
tivism; priming procedures and experimental variations of power can counter this limitation. 
Moreover, current horizontal/vertical approaches do not distinguish between having and not 
having power, although social cognition research documented differential effects of high and 
low power on content of self-concept, relationality, and cognition, which suggest previously 
neglected cultural differences. 
Rather than assume that the psychological models developed 
in the West are universal, cultural and cross-cultural psychol- 
ogists have drawn attention to the possible limitations of 
models grounded in an American or Western European 
worldview, as well as limitations of data drawn from col- 
lege-student subject pools that over-represent a young, 
high-status, and prosperous slice of any given society. In- 
deed, cultural and cross-cultural research argues that societ- 
ies and social strata within societies differ in their socializa- 
tion processes and therefore in content of self- concept, what 
makes for well-being, how individuals and groups are related 
to each other, and how people think. Particularized descrip- 
tions of various groups and societies made clear the multi- 
tude of ways of approaching the basic human endeavors of 
being a self, feeling well, and engaging with others and one's 
world. Unfortunately, this focus on detailed description did 
not lend itself to general predictions about how universal 
psychological models might need to be shaped or reframed 
by cultural factors, and, for the most part, early cultural and 
cross-cultural research failed to influence mainstream psy- 
chology. 
Cultural and cross-cultural research gained focus and pre- 
dictive power with the field's convergence on a particular 
pair of cultural constructs, individualism and collectivism. 
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While the term individualism was not coined by Hofstede 
(1980), who assessed culture through a workplace survey, his 
distillation of culture and cross-cultural difference in terms 
of individualism and three other societal-level culture con- 
structs (power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoid- 
ance) galvanized the field. By simplifying all of the nuance 
and complexity of culture into a more straightforward set of 
basic constructs, Hofstede's (1980) model allowed research- 
ers to begin to ask how cultural factors such as individualism 
might have shaped psychological theories previously as- 
sumed to be universal. Indeed, the follow-up research was al- 
most completely focused on the domain of individualism 
(later separated into individualism and collectivisrn). 
Broadly speaking, cultural research on individualism can 
be thought of in terms of a progression. Initial research pulled 
together many idiosyncratic differences within the individu- 
alism rubric and assumed a single scale, with individualism 
at one end and collectivism at the other. After progress was 
made with this simple model, a second wave of research in- 
cluded both individualism and collectivism as orthogonal 
factors. These models contrasted individuals and cultures as 
either individualistic or collectivistic. The third wave of re- 
search conceptualizes individualism and collectivism as 
more fluid and dynamic features of culture. This third wave 
of research links cultural research with experimental social 
psychology methodology by assuming that both individual- 
istic and collectivistic cultural frames are universally avail- 
able but differentially likely to be brought online into work- 
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ing memory. This recent development assumes that cultures 
differ in the number of situations in which individualism or 
collectivism are cued, but that both individualism and collec- 
tivism are universally cue-able and, once cued, produce the 
same effects across societies (for a review, see Oyserman, 
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002a; Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, & 
Coon, 2002b). Using priming techniques, this research has 
begun to provide insight into how culture matters-influenc- 
ing what is seen, what is remembered, and how information 
is processed. 
While fruitful, cultural and cross-cultural researchers do 
not see individualism and collectivism research alone as suf- 
ficient in scope to model all-important cultural differences. 
Indeed, individualism was the second cultural factor 
Hofstede (1980) identified; power distance was the first. 
Power distance involves the extent to which a society accepts 
and views as inevitable or functional human inequality in 
power, wealth, and prestige (Hofstede, 1980). Individualism 
highlights human differences, including awareness of un- 
equal distribution of valued characteristic~; power distance 
highlights the extent to which these individual differences are 
related directly to other inequalities in power, wealth, or 
prestige, and the extent to which these inequalities are seen as 
legitimate or illegitimate. By institutionalizing certain links 
between individual or group characteristics and inequalities 
in power, power distance as a cultural frame is assumed to 
provide legitimacy and the sense of fair treatment. That is, 
power distance has to do with the perceptions and responses 
of those both high and low in power within a particular 
system. 
Because goals can mostly only be carried out in conjunc- 
tion and collaboration with others, power, equality, and de- 
pendence are fundamental elements of any social structure or 
culture-yet, the effects of high and low power have not been 
much studied in the social sciences (see, however, Fiske, 
1991; Keltner, Gruenfield, & Anderson, 2003). Fiske (1991) 
and Keltner et al. (2003) both present broad reviews arguing 
that all relationships involve hierarchy, and that power is a 
pervasive part of human society. Within cultural and 
cross-cultural psychology, there were a number of attempts 
to move the field beyond individualism and collectivism and 
to take up consideration of how authority, power, and hierar- 
chy are integrated into societies. Unfortunately, until now, ef- 
forts such as Michael Bond's (1996) work on Chinese cul- 
ture, Alan Fiske's (1991) taxonomy of basic social 
relationships, and Triandis' (1995) focus on horizontallverti- 
cal individualism and collectivism have for the most part 
failed to focus cultural psychology as a whole on the implica- 
tions of power as a cultural construct. 
In their lead article, Shavitt, Lalwani, Zhang, and Torelli 
(2006) do a service to the field by suggesting a re-emphasis 
on power and power distance, focusing on Triandis' (1995) 
horizontal (valuing and emphasizing equality) and vertical 
(valuing and emphasizing hierarchy) axes. Much like the 
progression of individualism and collectivism research from 
a single individualism dimension to a two-construct individ- 
ualism and collectivism field, Shavitt and her colleagues 
remind us that research on power has to investigate both 
power differential (or a vertical focus) and equality (or a hori- 
zontal focus), because equality is not the same as accepting 
or not accepting a power differential. As described in the lead 
article, the horizontallvertical (HV) description is embedded 
within the description of individualism and collectivism fo- 
cusing on assessment of horizontal individualism (HI), verti- 
cal individualism (VI), horizontal collectivism (HC), and 
vertical collectivism (VC). Shavitt and colleagues show evi- 
dence that the HI-HC-VI-VC method of integrating the study 
of power and equality with the study of individualism and 
collectivism captures previously unexplored differences, for 
example, in social desirability responding. 
However, by considering power as an horizontal/vertical 
axis within the individualism~ollectivism framework, it is 
not possible to disentangle effects of power or equality from 
effects of individualism or collectivism. As Shavitt and col- 
leagues note, collectivism is correlated robustly with 
verticality. Moreover, the current operationalization of 
verticality (acceptance of power distance) and horizontality 
(equality) does not distinguish between having and not hav- 
ing power. Recent programs of research suggest that what 
matters is not simply whether a power differential exists- 
what matters is having or not having power (see Fiske, 2001 ; 
Keltner et al., 2003). It may therefore be more advantageous 
to treat high power, low power, and equality as separate as- 
pects to allow for more synergy between cross-cultural psy- 
chology and an already existing field of research on the ef- 
fects of having versus not having power in situations that are 
characterized by a power differential, and of being equal in 
equality situations. 
INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM, HIGH 
POWER, LOW POWER, AND EQUALITY 
Assessment and Conceptualization 
Hofstede (1980) described individualism and not individual- 
ism and collectivism; that is, he made the assumption that the 
opposite of individualism is collectivism, and that once high 
and low individualism were operationalized, there would be 
no need to separately operationalize collectivism. This sim- 
plifying assumption was accepted by many researchers, but a 
recent meta- analysis (Oyserman et al., 2002a) showed that 
individualism and collectivism are orthogonal. This means 
that individualism and collectivism, and their effects on psy- 
chological processes, must each be tested separately-pre- 
sumably because both exist to some extent in all societies and 
influence psychological processes when they are made sa- 
lient or brought to mind via situational priming. This same 
argument could be made for high power, low power, and 
equality. It seems reasonable to assume two orthogonal axes 
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of power (high and low), and equality (high and low), where 
low power may assume the form of dependence. 
Implications of Individualism and Collectivism, 
High Power, Low Power, and Equality 
To the extent that groups differ in individualism and collec- 
tivism, and European Americans (and Western Europeans) 
are high in individualism, this implies that the psychological 
models developed within this cultural frame-of self-con- 
cept content and functioning, well-being, attribution style, 
and relationality-are not universal models but simply mod- 
els derived from and applicable to an individualistic 
worldview, and that other models must be developed for 
other groups (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et 
al., 2002a; Oyserman et al., 2002b). A case can be made that 
contemporary American psychological research is particu- 
larly suited to an individualistic worldview as demonstrated 
by research on social and nonsocial cognition, including re- 
search on self-concept and relationality. Difference in power 
distance or horizontal/vertical individualism within Europe 
are noted in Shavitt and colleagues' lead article (2006) and 
conceptual reviews focused on the consequences of power 
differential on self-concept, interpersonal relations, and cog- 
nition (e.g., Fiske, 2001; Keltner et al., 2002) suggest that 
American society includes both. In the next section, I list 
some implications of these differences in cultural frames. 
With regard to self-concept, individualism implies that cre- 
ating and maintaining a positive sense of self is a basic human 
endeavor that involves feeling good about oneself and defining 
oneself in terms of differentiable attitudes, traits, and opin- 
ions. Collectivism, on the other hand, implies that being in a 
group is a basic human endeavor, so that self-concept involves 
group membership and self-defining traits should reflect the 
goals of collectivism, such as sacrifice for the common good 
and maintaining harmonious relationships with close others. 
These images are not contradictory and together describe the 
basic self-concept motives described in the literature-learn- 
ing about, feeling good about, and improving oneself, and us- 
ing self-knowledge to navigate the social world (e.g., 
Oyserman, 2001). However, fitting the implied dominance of 
individualism, self-esteem research and theorizing has long 
dominated the field (Baumeister, 1998). Broadening the focus 
beyond individualistic assumptions should facilitate attention 
to the other self-goals. Examination of high power, low power, 
and equality as cultural dimensions may facilitate linkage of 
self-concept literature to research on social identities, stereo- 
typing, and stigma that suggest that how the self is conceptual- 
ized is influenced by the relative power of the in-group to con- 
trol access to valued resources. 
With regard to interpersonal and intergroup relations, in- 
dividualism implies impermanence-one can become es- 
tranged from one's family, immigrate to a new country, con- 
vert to a new religion, and lose touch with friends. 
Collectivism implies permanence-one can never really 
leave these groups. Groups and boundaries are important and 
fixed facts of life to which one must accommodate, so that in- 
direct communication and methods are prized as ways to 
avoid disrupting in-group harmony. While individualism and 
collectivism research has provided insight into cross-cultural 
differences in use of equity, equality, and generosity norms 
(for a review, see Oyserman et al., 2002a), it is entirely possi- 
ble that this work has conflated individualism and collectiv- 
ism with high power, low power, and equality axes of culture. 
In part, that is because researchers often neglected to assess 
the cultural construct they believed to be at the root of the 
cross-national differences they found, and simply asserted 
that they are due to individualism and collectivism. Fiske 
(1991) suggested that all societies have some access to rela- 
tionships that are equitable as well as those that are based in 
differential power-although societies are likely to differ in 
the proportion of such relationships they are likely to experi- 
ence in their daily lives. For example, ease of interaction with 
strangers and obligation to in-groups may be results of indi- 
vidualism and collectivism, or they may be due to equality 
and power-dependence. As Shavitt and colleagues note in 
their discussion of verticality, power differential may often 
be positively associated with collectivism. This likely posi- 
tive association further complicates our ability to disentangle 
the constructs unless they are separately experimentally ma- 
nipulated. Moreover, disentangling and separately manipu- 
lating the power and equality constructs will allow for prog- 
ress integrating related cultural factors such as honor, which 
are likely to be separate from individualism and collectivism 
yet carry power-related meaning. 
With regard to cognition, individualism implies that judg- 
ment, reasoning, and causal inference are generally oriented 
toward the person rather than the situation or social context, 
because the decontextualized self is assumed to be a stable 
causal nexus. Consequently, individualism promotes a 
decontextualized reasoning style that assumes that social in- 
formation is not bound to social context. Oyserman and col- 
leagues have described this style as a 'separate-and- 
pull-apart' style as distinct from a situation-specific rela- 
tional 'embed-and-connect' style (Markus & Oyserman, 
1989; Oyserman et al., 2002b; Oyserman & Lee, in press). 
Follow-up research documents that priming individual- 
ism and collectivism shifts processing among Western (Eu- 
ropean Americans; Kuhnen & Oyserman, 2002; Haberstroh, 
Oyserman, Schwarz, Kuhnen, & Ji, 2002), and Eastern (Ko- 
rean; Oyserman, Sorensen, Cha, & Schwarz, 2006) partici- 
pants. The differences observed in priming experiments are 
compatible with the differences observed in cross-national 
comparisons between the United States and China 
(Haberstroh et al., 2002; Nisbett, 2003) and the United States 
and Japan (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). 
Primed or chronically collectivism-focused participants pro- 
cess for contextual, relative information; primed or chroni- 
cally individualism-focused participants process for main 
points or figures-not background. 
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Research on cognitive style has utilized the full range of 
procedures (priming, assessment of individualism and col- 
lectivism, and cross-national comparison) and, in this sense, 
may be more robustly attributable to individualism and col- 
lectivism than is the case for research on interpersonal and in- 
tergroup relations. However, there is no reason to assume that 
the only cross- cultural differences in cognitive style are 
those "pull-apart" and "connect" procedural operating 
schemas attributable to individualism and collectivism. An- 
other important and relevant distinction is global versus local 
processing. Social cognition research suggests that individu- 
als generally process information at a global, schema- driven 
level and utilize a more specific, detail-oriented approach 
only under certain circumstances (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Asking how power influences social judgment, Fiske 
(2001) conducted a series of studies demonstrating that pro- 
cessing of information differs across situations in which 
power is equal, power is unequal and one has it, and power is 
unequal and one does not have it. In each case, power is 
primed via participation in tasks in which one's outcomes are 
or are not mutually dependent upon another's efforts. When 
both actors are dependent on each other for their outcomes- 
a situation of equality-they are particularized in their pro- 
cessing of the other's strengths and weaknesses. When one 
actor depends on the other but the dependence is not mutual, 
processing style shifts to a more schema-driven global pro- 
cessing for those with power, and to detail-focused attention 
with a tendency to create a positive synthesis for those with- 
out power. 
While Fiske (2001) does not use these terms, this research 
suggest that power-dependence and equality are likely to re- 
late to the tendency to use global as compared to local pro- 
cessing styles. Global processing-described as seeing the 
forest but not the trees-emphasizes the whole gestalt and 
seems to be the prerogative of those who have power, not 
those who lack power. Local processing is used both by those 
who are in a situation of equality, as well as those who are in a 
situation in which they lack power. In addition to research on 
power, global versus local processing style has been studied 
as it relates to mood (Gasper & Clore, 2002) and self-regula- 
tory focus (Foster & Higgins, 2005). Bad mood and a cau- 
tion-oriented focus on fulfilling duties and obligations have 
both been associated with local processing, while good mood 
and a promotion-oriented focus on attaining success have 
both been associated with global processing via experimental 
manipulation. Throughout, these influences are consistent 
with the assumption that processing strategies are situated 
and tuned to meet current situational requirements (for a re- 
view, see Schwarz, 2002). In the case of power, when the sit- 
uation evokes high power, a global, schema-, stereotype-, or 
expectancy-driven style is sufficient; when the situations 
evokes low power or equality, a local, detail-oriented style is 
necessary. 
Power itself has been related to both mood and self- 
regulatory focus (for a review, see Keltner et al., 2003). 
Global and local styles are similar to, but not identical with, 
the cognitive styles previously related to individualism and 
collectivism, and can contribute to a fuller account of cultur- 
ally embedded cognitive styles. Local processing is not the 
same as the kind of context-dependent and relational 
(Oyserman et al., 2002b) or holistic (Nisbett, 2003) process- 
ing attributed to collectivism in general, or to Chinese culture 
in particular. Local processing is primed by situations of 
equality, as well as by situations of dependence and lack of 
power. Global processing is similar to, but not the same as, 
the pull-apart (Oyserman et al., 2002b; Oyserman & Lee, in 
press) or analytic processing (Nisbett, 2003) attributed to in- 
dividualism, generally, or Western culture, specifically. 
Global processing is primed by situations of power distance 
in which one has power. 
This brief overview suggests that it will be advantageous 
to isolate the role of high power, low power (dependence), 
and equality, and to develop experimental procedures that al- 
low tests of causality. Correlational research on individual- 
ism and collectivism-showing an association with content 
of self-concept, interactional style, and cognitive pro- 
cesses-was strengthened and moved forward by shifting to 
priming techniques, and the same may be expected for high 
power, low power, and equality. These constructs are both 
universal-all humans are sensitive to cues about power and 
respond differently when they do or do not have power-and 
likely to differ cross-culturally in the extent to which they are 
chronically accessible. Cues about power and equality are 
likely to influence everything from overt behavior to strate- 
gies of information processing. 
Thus, thinking about high power, low power, and equality 
as separate constructs suggests, first, that currently used ex- 
perimental procedures for priming individualism and collec- 
tivism should be tested to see if they carry with them activa- 
tion of power and equality constructs. This could be done 
using simple techniques such as word completion tasks or se- 
mantic priming tasks, to see if words related to power and 
equality are more or less accessible after individualism and 
collectivism priming. Second, thinking about power and 
equality as separate constructs also suggests that their influ- 
ence can and should be tested via standard priming proce- 
dures (see also Meyers-Levy, 2006). One promising task in- 
volves having participants fill out relevant rating scales (e.g., 
a social hierarchy attitudes scale) before rather than after the 
dependent variable is assessed. Alternatively, participants 
could be primed with high or low power or equality concepts 
through a scrambled sentence task (e.g., Smith & Trope, 
2006), through exposure to images of power and hierarchy 
versus equality, or through relevant scenarios. 
Just as the field of cultural psychology has moved beyond 
the initial assumption that cultures are high either in individ- 
ualism or collectivism, power and equality constructs are 
also likely to be culturally universal. Equality relationships 
and power-differential relationships are basic to the social 
units that make up societies: family, school, or work; one's 
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peer and sibling relationships; and interactions between ra- 
cial, ethnic, and religious groups. Although societies may be 
differentially likely to make having high or low power or be- 
ing equal salient, these constructs should have similar effects 
across societies once they are brought to mind. 
Because high power, low power (dependence), and equal- 
ity are not narrowly defined, priming power is likely to influ- 
ence each of the domains previously studied in individualism 
and collectivism research. In terms of self-concept, priming 
power, equality, and dependence is likely to make salient dif- 
ferent ways of defining the self. In terms of interpersonal and 
intergroup relationships, priming power, equality, and de- 
pendence are likely to make salient different ways of making 
sense of, and engaging with, others. Yet, it is in the domain of 
cognition, memory, and perception for which research on 
power may provide the most promising venues for new re- 
search. As Shavitt and colleagues note, taking power into ac- 
count is not redundant with taking individualism and collec- 
tivism into account. Understanding high power, low power 
(dependence), and equality is a promising next step in cul- 
tural and cross-cultural research. 
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